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Using Former Employer's Customer List to Solicit
Customers Held a Violation of California's Uniform
Trade Secrets Act
by Bonnie Katubig
In Morlife, Inc. v. Lloyd Perry,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997), a California Court of Appeal
held that former employees who
used business cards, obtained during
the course their employment, to
solicit business in direct competition
with their former employer violated
California's Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA"), CAL. Civ. CODE
§3426 (West 1996).
Former Employees Solicited
Morlife's Customers
Defendant Lloyd Perry ("Perry")
worked for Morlife as a sales
representative, and Defendant Carl
Bowersmith ("Bowersmith") was
Morlife's production manager. Both
Perry and Bowersmith held "key-
positions" at Morlife and had
"intimate knowledge" of its busi-
ness. While a Morlife employee,
Perry signed an agreement not to use
confidential customer information
upon termination of his employment
at Morlife. Perry and Bowersmith
resigned from Morlife to form
Burlingame Builders
("Burlingame"), which competed
directly with Morlife in the commer-
cial roofing business. Upon his
resignation, Perry took the customer
business cards he amassed during
his employment with Morlife. These
business cards reflected 75 to 80
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percent of Morlife's customer base.
Using these cards, Defendants
contacted Morlife customers and
solicited business for Burlingame.
Morlife filed suit claiming
Defendants unfairly competed with
Morlife by misappropriating its
confidential customer information in
direct violation of the UTSA and
California's Unfair Competition Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 -
17209 (West 1996). The trial court
held that Defendants violated the
UTSA and granted Morlife damages
for unjust enrichment. In addition,
the court permanently enjoined
Burlingame from doing business
with the unfairly-solicited former
Morlife customers. The court also
enjoined Defendants from soliciting
any Morlife customer they discov-
ered while employed at Morlife.
Finally, the court refused to grant
additional relief to Morlife under the
Unfair Competition Act because
such recovery would have dupli-
cated that available under the
UTSA. Similarly, the appellate court
only considered the UTSA claim,
and did not examine Plaintiff's
Unfair Competition Act claim.
California Adopted the
UTSA
Over forty states have adopted
some version of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. By enacting the UTSA,
California determined that "the right
to free competition does not include
the right to use confidential work
product of others." Under
California's version of the act, a
litigant establishes a violation of the
act by showing that the information:
(1) constituted a "trade secret" under
the UTSA; and (2) another party
"misappropriated" this trade secret.
"Trade secret" and "misappropria-
tion" are defined by the statute and
case law.
Confidential Compilations
of Customers' Names Are
"Trade Secrets" Under the
UTSA
Section 3426.1 of the UTSA
defines "trade secret" as "informa-
tion.., that: (1) [d]erives indepen-
dent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally
known to the public ... ; and (2) [i]s
the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy." In analyz-
ing this case under the two-pronged
definition of a trade secret, the court
first examined whether the customer
information Perry obtained from
Morlife had independent economic
value because it was unknown to the
public.
Information has independent
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economic value if "the secrecy of
this information provides a business
with a substantial business advan-
tage." Specifically, the court found
that a customer list has independent
economic value if its disclosure
would enable competitors to solicit
customers who have already
demonstrated an interest in a unique
product. The UTSA protects
customer lists as trade secrets when
former employees could use the
information to cater to the individual
needs of their former customers.
Customer lists provide a competitive
advantage by enabling former
employees to "solicit both more
selectively and more effectively."
The court held that the compila-
tion of customer names had indepen-
dent economic value for four
reasons. First, Morlife expended
great effort and incurred great
expenditure in compiling and
maintaining the list. The court found
that the list, developed over a period
of years, was valuable because it
specifically identified customers in
need of Morlife's unique services,
rather than simply listing names.
Second, Morlife's customers "were
not readily ascertainable, but only
discoverable with great effort, and
the expenditure of considerable time
and money" in telemarketing,
advertisements, expensive mailings,
and personal visits. Third, Morlife
maintained specific knowledge of its
customers' needs. This information
would be unknown to the public.
Fourth, Morlife restricted access to
these records by requiring employ-
ees, through employment agree-
ments and handbooks, to limit the
circulation of customer information.
Given Morlife's substantial invest-
ment in compiling its customer list,
the court held that the customer list
Perry obtained from Morlife
satisfied the first prong of the
UTSA's definition of "trade secret."
The court next considered the
second prong of the UTSA's
definition of trade secret by examin-
ing whether Morlife made reason-
able efforts to maintain the secrecy
of its customer information. In this
case, Morlife called its customer
information a trade secret. The court
recognized that calling something a
trade secret does not necessarily
make it a trade secret under the
UTSA. However, in this case, the
court found that Plaintiffs went
beyond merely labeling its customer
list a trade secret. Plaintiff expended
considerable time and resources to
keep the list secret. The court's
conclusion that Morlife maintained
the secrecy of the list hinged on
three key pieces of evidence. First,
Morlife's president referred to the
customer list as the company's
"main asset." As a result, the
company restricted computer access
to the list. Second, Perry's employ-
ment contract barred him from using
Morlife's customer names and
telephone numbers to compete with
the company. Third, Morlife's
employee handbooks expressly
prohibited employees from using or
disclosing confidential information,
including customer list, upon
termination. Based on these efforts
and expenditures, the court was
convinced that Morlife took reason-
able steps to maintain the
information's secrecy. Accordingly,
the court held that Morlife's
customer list constituted a trade
secret under the UTSA.
Misappropriation Defined
by Statute and Case Law
Once a plaintiff proves that a
customer list constitutes a trade
secret under the UTSA, the plaintiff
must next prove that the former
employee misappropriated the list in
an attempt to gain an unfair advan-
tage. Section 3426.1 of the UTSA
defines "misappropriation," in
pertinent part, as the nonconsensual
"disclosure or use of a trade secret."
The court relied upon California
case law to affirm the lower court's
decision that Burlingame misappro-
priated Morlife's customer list, a
trade secret, by using it to solicit
customers without Morlife's
consent.
The court first explained that
"cases decided before and after the
adoption of the UTSA... equated
acts of solicitation with 'use' or
'misappropriation' of protected
information." For example under
Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v.
West, 246 P.2d 11 (Cal. S.Ct. 1952),
solicitation includes appealing,
applying, and asking for something,
but "merely informing customers of
one's former employer of a change
in employment, without more, is not
solicitation." Relying on Aetna, the
court stated that if Defendants
merely informed Morlife's previous
customers of Burlingame's forma-
tion, their conduct would not
amount to "misappropriation."
However, Defendants went further
than merely informing past custom-
ers, and the court relied on American
Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks, 262
Cal. Rptr. 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) to
support this holding.
The Sacks court held that a
former employee misappropriated a
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customer list when she sent letters to
her former customers, announced
her new competitive business, and
invited them to contact her. In the
instant case, the court found the
Sacks holding persuasive for three
reasons. First, the customer lists,
used in both the Sacks case and the
instant case, had value because they
allowed former employees to focus
solicitation efforts on customers
who had already demonstrated a
need for a particular type of service.
Second, in both cases, the former
employers took reasonable precau-
tions to protect the secrecy of their
lists by requiring specific employee
confidentiality agreements. Third,
Defendants in both cases went
beyond merely announcing their
new businesses and actually
solicited business from their former
customers. Based on these three
similarities between the Sacks case
and the instant case, the court found
the Sacks precedent persuasive.
In addition, the court rejected
Defendants' argument that the
controlling case on the issue was
Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179
Cal. App. 3d 124 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986). The Moss court held that a
former employee's personal relation-
ship with past customers cannot be
protected as a trade secret because
that employee cannot be expected to
forget the details of the relationship.
In the instant case, the court
reasoned that the Moss court failed
to recognize that even when an
employee establishes a personal
relationship with a customer, the
employee renders services for the
benefit of the employer, who
deserves protection against misap-
propriation of this information.
Furthermore, the Moss court's
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decision pre-dated the enactment of
the UTSA, and thus its decision was
not based on the UTSA's definition
of "misappropriation." Therefore,
the court found the Moss decision
unpersuasive and held that Defen-
dants in this case misappropriated
Morlife's trade secrets in violation
of the UTSA.
Injunction and Unjust
Enrichment Damages Were
Appropriate Remedies
After affirming the district court's
opinion that Defendants violated the
UTSA, the court affirmed the lower
court's award of both injunctive
relief and monetary damages. In
addressing the injunctive relief, the
court stated that the relief overall
was not overly broad and was
authorized by the UTSA. Moreover,
the court held that the injunctions
conformed with similar court
restrictions in the past. The court
reasoned that the injunctions
"correctly [draw] that line," leaving
Burlingame free to solicit customers
whose identities are not trade secrets
of Morlife. The injunctions did not
cover potential customers with
whom Defendants had no contact
while at Morlife.
Specifically, the court upheld the
duration of the first injunction to
eliminate the advantage Burlingame
obtained by acquiring the Morlife
customers who transferred their
business to Burlingame. The UTSA
authorizes an injunction to continue
if necessary to eliminate any
commercial advantage derived from
the misappropriation. The court also
upheld the scope of the second
injunction because the injunction is
limited and restricts solicitation of
the customers that Perry and
Bowersmith received confidential
information on during their employ-
ment at Morlife.
In addition to upholding the
injunctions, the court addressed the
monetary damages awarded to
Plaintiffs. Defendants had argued
that their payment of royalties to
Morlife for using the customer
information was the correct measure
of damages, as allowed under
§3426.3 of the UTSA. The court
rejected Defendants's argument for
two reasons. First, Defendants did
not provide sufficient evidence to
determine reasonable royalties in
this situation. Furthermore, under
the UTSA, an award of royalties is
only appropriate when a court can
compute neither actual damages to
the holder of the trade secrets nor
unjust enrichment to the trade secret
misappropriator.
In this case, the lower court was
able to compute unjust enrichment
damages. The court calculated these
damages based on Defendants'
salaries for the first six months of
Burlingame's operations multiplied
by 33% - the percentage of
Burlingame's business acquired
from former Morlife customers. The
court reached a total damages
amount of $39,293.47. The appellate
court held that this amount was a
"reasonable approximation" of the
unjust enrichment received by
Burlingame. Because the lower
court was able to compute unjust
enrichment damages in this case, the
court upheld the unjust damages
award and rejected Defendants' plea
for royalties.
In sum, the court held that
Morlife's customer list constituted a
"trade secret" because the list had
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independent economic value and
Morlife took reasonable efforts to
keep the list secret. The court further
held that Burlingame misappropri-
ated the customer list when it used
the list to solicit former Morlife
customers. Furthermore, the court
upheld the trial court's award of
injunctive and monetary relief.
Concurring Opinion
Questioned Factual
Conclusions and Injunctive
Relief
Judge Haerle concurred with the
majority decision but expressed
reservations about the trial court's
factual conclusions and injunctive
awards. He stated that Perry only
took a collection of customer
business cards, not a "customer list"
or information from the computer
files on restricted access. Haerle
further noted that other former
employees in American Paper and
Packaging Products Inc. v. Kirgan,
228 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) had done "similar things"
without incurring liability under the
UTSA. Judge Haerle also challenged
the trial court's finding that all of the
customers who transferred their
business from Morlife to
Burlingame had been solicited by
Defendants when only three of the
four former Morlife customers
testified that they were solicited.
However, he conceded that the
appellate court is to defer to the trier
of fact.
In questioning the permanent
duration of the primary injunctive
relief, Judge Haerle agreed with the
Kirgan court that an injunction
should only last as long "as is
necessary to eliminate the commer-
cial advantage that a person would
obtain through misappropriation."
He suggested that the appropriate
time period was satisfied with the
initial injunction of the lower court
which eliminated any advantage
Burlingame had enjoyed.
Eighth Circuit Denies Jaw Implant Recipients Relief
From Dow Chemical
by Wendy K. Davis
In Temporomandibular Joint
Implant Recipients v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir.
1997), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor
of Defendant, Dow Chemical
Company ("Dow Chemical") and
against Plaintiffs, recipients of
silicone-based temporomandibular
joint ("TMJ") implants manufac-
tured by Dow Coming, a subsidiary
of Dow Chemical. Plaintiffs sought
damages from Dow Chemical, a
parent corporation of Dow Coming.
The Eighth Circuit held that: (1) the
district court did not grant summary
judgment prematurely; (2) Dow
Chemical's preliminary silicone
testing and trademark agreements
with Dow Coming did not constitute
an "undertaking" for purposes of
triggering Dow Chemical's duty of
reasonable care to Plaintiffs; (3)
Dow Chemical did not "aid and
abet" Dow Coming's allegedly
tortious activities; and (4) Dow
Chemical was not liable for fraudu-
lent concealment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, or conspiracy
regarding Dow Coming and the
TMJ implants.
Plaintiffs Allegedly Injured
by Jaw Implants Sue in
Product Liability
The TMJ connects the upper and
lower jaws. Plaintiffs received TMJ
implants, which are surgically
inserted prosthetic devices made in
part of silicone that replace dysfunc-
tional TMJs. Plaintiffs claimed that
their TMJ implants "deteriorated"
after they were implanted, which
caused, among other things, "sur-
rounding jaw bond disintegration,
serious autoimmune responses, and
severe head and neck pain." Plain-
tiffs sought damages for their
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